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1. Introduction 
The increasing relevance of Internet-based markets requires a sustained investigation into the 
relationship between design and user behavior. This research begins within the sociology of 
quantification and markets to investigate the impacts of basic design decisions on user behavior 
and individual success on a widely used crowdfunding website. This study looks at one common 
design feature, publishing recipients’ sex, on the probability of receiving funding. Following 
research in the sociology of gender, these effects are defined along individual, behavioral, and 
structural dimensions. The results reveal that before teachers’ sex was published, gender 
discrimination was weak and inconsistent. However, afterward gender discrimination increases 
by an order of magnitude and becomes systematized. Contrary to expectation, donors did not 
discriminate by sex category, but by teachers’ structural position and the kinds of language they 
used. Implications for research on gender discrimination, priming, and online behavior are 
discussed.   
1.1 Virtual Markets and the Architecture of Decision-Making 
Virtual markets are becoming increasingly prevalent: matching workers to work, individuals to 
jobs, seed funding to entrepreneurs, liquidity to businesses, and philanthropists to causes. As 
sociologists of finance have pointed out, these internet-based markets are distinguishable from 
traditional, in-person marketplaces, in part, by their all-to-all, scopic architecture replacing 
traditional networks of direct exchange (Cetina and Bruegger 2002; White 1993). Research on 
this shift in the socio-technical structure of markets has demonstrated the relative importance of 
these new information architectures for local decision-making (Saavedra, Hagerty, and Uzzi 2011; 
Beunza and Stark 2011).  
  
Simultaneously, social scientists have become interested in new forms and features of virtual 
social organization such as crowdsourcing, virtual social structures, and distributed cognition and 
human computation (Bainbridge 2007; Watts 2007). This research has shown how communities 
organize themselves by adapting their technological architecture to allocate and manage work. 
Thus far, little research has attempted to examine how the architecture of virtual markets 
influences their social organization. For example, while crowds have long been seen as calculators 
(Galton 1907); studies on the ramifications of virtualization for the process and outcomes of 
market resource allocation have been sparse (see Litzenberger, Castura, and Gorelick 2012 for 
exceptions in finance). This research attempts to bridge these by providing evidence for the 
relationship between information and decision-making in virtual a market. In the present case, a 
slight change in information rather than organization, generated a new, systematic allocation of 
resources among a national market of teachers in the United States. 
1.2 Gender and Decision-Making 
Existing research has demonstrated that providing individuals with gendered information 
changes the way they process information, make choices, and behave; most often in ways that 
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typically advantage men or disadvantage women. However, while existing research suggests that 
adding information regarding teachers’ sex should produce some discrimination, questions 
surrounding the reproducibility of priming effects, the limited range of gender information 
typically used, and the simplicity in how the effect is analyzed call into question whether simply 
adding “Mr.” or “Mrs.” to teachers’ names would change donors’ behavior (Cameron, Brown-
Iannuzzi, and Payne 2012; Doyen et al. 2012). The data from DonorsChoose provide a strong, 
externally valid test for these effects that can be captured in heretofore under-explored 
dimensions. 
 
Following the gender system perspective, this research defines gender along three dimensions 
(Risman 2004). First, the individual dimension of gender relates to beliefs about and 
categorization within the male/female binary (Ridgeway and Correll 2004). Second, the 
interactional dimension of gender refers to how one behaves in interaction as it relates to the 
binary, that is, whether one behaves in masculine or feminine ways (West and Zimmerman 2009). 
Thirdly, the institutional dimension refers to gendered expectations for behavior embedded in 
social structures whether institutions, organizations, or common social contexts (Acker 1990; 
Williams 2000). Due to sparse data, the need for experimental simplicity, and difficulty 
distinguishing the dimensions empirically; most research focuses on only one of these dimensions 
and few studies have investigated the interaction between them. This study examines all three 
simultaneously to investigate the extent to which donors discriminate and whether and to what 
extent this discrimination changes when new information is provided within the virtual market.  
2.0 Data and Methods 
DonorsChoose is a crowdfunding website for public school teachers in the United States. Since its 
inception in 2000, over 90,000 teachers from more than 40,000 schools have posted almost 
300,000 projects. The data for all of these have been provided in this analysis. However, only data 
from between 2005 and 2010 are used as the event of interest, publishing teachers’ sex, occurred 
in early 2008 as identified by archived versions of the website available on the Internet Archive. 
In the final analysis, a single linear model predicting the probability of projects’ success is 
compared before and after teachers’ sex is published. For this model, the three dimensions of 
gender are operationally distinguished from one another and specified as independent and 
interacting paramters.  
  
The three dimensions of gender are operationalized using a combination of regression and text 
classification methods. Individual gender is a binary variable taken directly from teachers’ self-
reported sex; “Mr.”, “Mrs.”, and “Ms.”; which teachers reported to DonorsChoose throughout its 
history. In all, over 99.9% of teachers provided a “Mr.” “Mrs.” or “Ms.” since 2005 and those 
reporting nothing or “Dr.” are excluded. Interactional gender, that is, how teachers behave, was 
inferred from the essays teachers wrote to appeal to donors. Naïve-Bayes classification; chosen for 
its human readability, facility for external validation, and parametric simplicity; was used to 
measure the relative “masculinity” or “femininity” of individual essays. The measure used was 
the classifier’s likelihood ratio of a text being written by a “Mr.” (masculine) rather than written 
by a “Mrs.” or “Ms.” (feminine). Lastly, institutional gender was operationalized with a linear 
model using structural features to predict the probability a teacher was male. Specifically, the 
model used grade-level and subject taught, whether a teachers’ school was traditional or non-
traditional school, and the school’s metropolitan type to predict the binary measure of sex. In 
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essence, institutional gender is the proportion of teachers expected to be male given a particular 
set of structural characteristics. In summary, individual gender measures whether or not a 
teacher is male or female. Interactional gender measures whether or not an essay is written in a 
masculine or feminine way. And, institutional gender measures the extent to which a teacher is 
more likely to be a man or woman given their school, grade, and subject. The crux of the analysis 
relies on using these three measures of gender to predict the probability that a project will receive 
funding before and after sex was published. 
Figure 1: This chart shows the scale of change in the probability of funding after sex was published (grey area). The 
figure is produced by re-estimating the linear model containing controls and the variables of interest on five months of 
data at a time starting in 2005. The x-axis is the median month of the window while the y-axis is the predicted 
probability for a specific combination of individual and institutional sex. As the graph shows, after sex was published, 
both male and female teachers in male-dominated locations (black and green lines respectively) became much more 
likely to get funding than men and women in female-dominated locations (blue and red lines).  
3.0 Results and Discussion 
The results of the analysis show the emergence and systematization of bias, providing new 
insight into the social structure of gender. First, as social psychologists have argued, sex category 
appears to be a sparkplug, turning gender on. However, the differentiation it initiates is a 
differential evaluation of institutional expectations. It’s the gendering of the social context (grade, 
subject, and school) that constitutes the largest source of discrimination while the way teachers 
actually behave has a weaker, but significant influence. 
 
Several alternative hypotheses were tested. First, the financial crisis occurring around this time 
largely occurs after discrimination has already developed. Second, the influx of new teachers are 
compared separately and results show both pre-existing and new teachers had the same 
probability of receiving funding. Finally, there appear to be no network effects in predicting 
gender discrimination. However, data limitations prevent a full test of these alternatives. Indeed, 
some of the effects are extinguished by 2010, but tests of different hypotheses fail to explain this.  
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4. Conclusion 
The results of this study not only push the sociology of gender forward by elaborating the 
relationship between the three dimensions of gender, but also demonstrate the power of 
information for social structure in virtual markets. It’s most notable that information about 
teachers’ sex was implemented as passive information which could not be used to navigate the 
website whether by searching, sorting, or filtering projects. It was also published in only a few 
places on an otherwise already well developed and widely used website. Yet, when this piece of 
information was added, a systematic gender evaluation process was initiated and millions of 
dollars reallocated along gendered lines. 
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